3 century between 1960 and the mid 1980s: recent EU consumer and environmental regulations have typically been more stringent and innovative than those of the US.
To borrow Lennart Lundqvist's formulation, which he used to contrast American and Swedish air pollution control standards during the 1970s, since around 1990 the American "hare" has been moving forward at a tortoise pace, while since the mid 1980s the pace of the European "tortoise" resembles that of a hare. 3 To employ a different metaphor, in a number of significant respects European and American regulatory politics and policies have "traded places." Regulatory issues were formerly more politically salient and civic interests more influential in the United States than in most individual European countries or the EU.
More recently, this pattern has been reversed. Consequently, over the last fifteen years, the locus of policy innovation with respect to many areas of consumer and environmental regulation has passed from the US to Europe.
This historical shift in the pattern of divergence of European and American consumer and environmental regulations poses two questions. First, why has consumer and environmental regulation become more stringent and innovative in Europe since the mid 1980s? Second, why did it become less stringent and innovative in the US after 1990? This article addresses both these questions, but it focuses primarily on describing and explaining the shift in European regulatory politics and policies.
The first section of this article reviews comparative studies of European and
American regulatory policies and politics prior to 1990. It then documents the subsequent changes in the relationship between American and European regulatory standards. The following section explores the changes in European public administration that have accompanied these shifts in European regulatory politics and policies. It then presents an 4 explanation for the "new" politics of consumer and environmental regulation in Europe.
They are attributable to three inter-related factors: a series of regulatory failures within Europe, broader and stronger political support for more stringent and comprehensive regulatory standards, and the growth in the regulatory competence of the European Union.
In a number of important respects, European regulatory politics and policies since the mid 1980s resemble those of the United States from the early 1960s to 1990, a parallel which the article explores. The final substantive section offers an explanation for the slow-down in the pace of American consumer and environmental regulation after 1990. The article concludes by presenting a model of the dynamics of regulatory stringency.
AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
From the 1960s through the mid 1980s, a number of important consumer and environmental protection standards were more stringent in America than in Europe.
According to a comprehensive study of chemical regulation published in 1985, the United
States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany "have compiled similar records in controlling substances suspected of causing cancer in humans." 4 Yet the study also points to a number of cases of relative American stringency. For example, "British agencies generally require more definite evidence of carcinogenetic before initiating regulatory action than their American counterparts." 5 More often than not, the US was the first country to take significant restrictive action on suspected or confirmed human carcinogens. 6 For example, the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found the pesticides aldrin and deildrin to be carcinogenic, while on the basis of the same studies British authorities concluded that they did not present a risk of cancer. 7 The US subsequently banned most uses of these pesticides while Britain imposed no restrictions. The EU was strongly influenced by a widespread consumer boycott of meat inspired by reports of deformities in infant s due to their parents' consumption of hormone treated beef.
Although the EU's own scientific advisory bodies subsequently concluded that the five disputed hormones did not pose a threat to human health, and the European producers of the hormones vigorously opposed the ban, in the end public pressures proved decisive. As Franz Andreissen, the EC's farm commissioner put it, "Scientific advice is important, but it is not decisive. In public opinion, this is a very delicate issue that has to be dealt with in political terms." 27 By contrast, in the US, the safety of any of the five growth hormones never entered the political agenda.
A related area in which the EU and the US adopted divergent policies involved BST, a hormone designed to boost milk production. The EU imposed a moratorium on its use in The EU has adopted a much more extensive array of animal protection measures than the US, including for example, banning the use of leg-hold traps for capturing wild animals in 1991. In contrast, the US only adopted a partial ban following pressures from the EU in 1997. 31 The EU issued standards in 1999 for cages for battery hens and for the treatment of animals in transit. Such rules remain non-existent in the US. Nor are recent cases of more stringent or innovative European consumer and environmental regula tions confined to food safety or agriculture. While public or quasipublic eco-labelling schemes spread from Germany and Sweden to much of Europe during the second half of the 1980s and were adopted by the EU in 1992, they continue to play little role in the United States. 37 In 1994, both inspired and pressured by policies previously 13 adopted by Germany and Denmark, the EU established ambitious recycling targets for glass,
paper, plastics and aluminium. 38 In the US there are no federal regulations governing packaging wastes; recycling requirements remain governed by local laws, which are typically less stringent and comprehensive than the 1994 EU directive.
In 2000, the EU approved an automobile recycling regulation, which, in addition to In 1999, the European Commission banned the use of phthalate softeners in soft toys.
It acted in part as a response to a determined Greenpeace campaign claiming that the chemical was both a carcinogen and a potential distorter of gender characteristics. This issue has been less salient in the US, where companies have only been advised to restrict their use. 40 The 1990 US Clean Air Act Amendments did continue the pattern of more stringent
American automotive emission standards, though in the case of heavy duty vehicles, EU standards adopted in 1998 are now more stringent than those of the US. producing less polluting cars for the American market, it made both economic and environmental sense to require these firms to market similar vehicles in Europe. 44 As a Swedish panel noted: "the only realistic solution to the problem of strengthening the Swedish exhaust gas regulations seems, for the moment, to be an adaptation to the United States regulations." 45 More recently the transatlantic flow of influence has been in the opposite direction.
American restrictions on leg-traps and its ban on animal feed for cattle have been influenced by developments in Europe, as ha ve proposals to address the safety of genetically modified foods and seeds, global climate change and electronic recycling.
.
CHANGES IN ERUOEPAN REGULATORY POLICIES AND INSTITUIONS
The emergence of the precautionary principle as a guide to regulatory decisionmaking represents an important dimension of the new European approach to risk regulation. While the precautionary principle cannot be divorced from science, since "a scientific view of the risk is an essential component of the evaluation of risk that the principle anticipates," its growing popularity in Europe reflects the perception that scientific knowledge is an inadequate guide to regulatory policy. 48 It both requires the extension of scientific knowledge and while simultaneously acknowledging "the possible intrinsic limitations of scientific knowledge in providing the appropriate information in good time." 49 The principle thus both increases public expectations of science and reflects the public's scepticism of scientific knowledge. In effect, it reduces the scientific threshold for regulatory policy-making. By mandating or precluding regulatory action, in advance of scientifically confirmed case-effect relationships, the principle, "curtails the ability of politicians to invoke scientific uncertainty as a justification for avoiding or delaying the imposition of more stringent protection measures." 50 While its legal significance at both the EU and national level remains unclear, the practical effect of the precautionary principle has frequently been to permit, or even mandate, the adoption of more risk-averse policies. It explicitly acknowledges the inherently political nature of regulatory decision-making by enabling policy-makers to take into account a wide variety of non-scientific factors, including public opinion and social values. As Jordan and O'Riordan observe, "The stringency with which the precautionary principle is applied depends upon and is also a useful barometer of deeper social and economic changes.
Precautionary measures, for example, are most likely to be applied when public opinion is instinctively for knowledgeably risk-averse." 51 The frequency with which the precautionary principle has been evoked in Europe among both activists and policy-makers also has an ideological dimension. It reflects not only a decline in the role of science as a guide to policy-making, but also a decrease in public confidence in the benefits of technological innovation. Frequently underlying its invocation is the assumption that modern technology poses dangers of which we are unaware and that to avoid future harm we need to introduce new technologies more cautiously. As Corrine Lepage, the former French Environment Minister writes in her co-authored book on the precautionary principle, "The precautionary principle precisely responds to the need for prudence when faced with the consequences of technological progress, whose repercussions are exponential and unknown." 52 For many environmentalists, this is precisely one of its most important attractions.
Yet somewhat paradoxically, European regulatory administration is also becoming more scientifically rigorous. At both the national and the EU levels, there is increased recognition of the need to strengthen the capacity of government agencies to conduct risk assessments and to improve the quality of scientific information available to decisionmakers. An important factor underlying this development is an increase in judicial review of regulatory decisions at both the European and international levels. 53 Just as American regulatory agencies engaged in more formal risk assessment in order to defend their decisions in federal court from challenges by both public interest groups and industry, so
Europe's national authorities and the EU are undertaking similar steps in order to defend their decisions before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and World Trade Organization dispute panels.
European regulatory institutions have also changed. In particular, to improve the quality of regulatory decision-making, risk assessment is increasingly being separated from risk manageme nt. The former is the advice and information scientists provide to policymakers; the latter is what policy-makers decide. This separation has been institutionalized at the EU level by the establishment of quasi-independent regulatory agencies such as the new food safety agency that will perform risk assessments, with the decision being made by the Commission. Similar models have been adopted for food safety agencies in France, Germany and Britain. This separation has a number of purposes. Most obviously, it is designed to prevent "regulatory capture" by making regulatory policy-making more transparent : when risk assessments are made public, the public can determine the extent to which political officials are accepting or ignoring the relevant scientific advice. Secondly, it enables policymakers to take into account considerations beyond science in making regulatory decisions, 19 such as public attitudes. Thirdly, it protects the integrity of the risk assessors since their only role is to provide scientific information to policy-makers. But perhaps most importantly, it makes policy-makers more politically accountable for regulatory policy-making: if irreversible harm results from their decision or non-decision, it is now clearer whom to blame.
EXPLAINING THE NEW EUROPEAN REGULATORY REGIME
What accounts for these changes in European regulatory policies and institutions ?
Explaining a complex set of developments over a period of nearly two decades presents a difficult analytical challenge. However, three sets of inter-related factors appear to have contributed to these institutional and policy shifts. They are: a series of regulatory failures and crises; broader citizen support for more risk-averse regulatory policies within Europe;
and the growth of the regulatory competence of the EU. The former two factors have affected policies at both the national and EU levels; the latter has affected regulatory policies at the European level. Each of these factors is discussed below.
Regulatory Failures and Crises
The most important factor contribut ing to the increased stringency of health, safety and environmental regulation in Europe has been a series of regulatory failures and crises that placed new regulatory issues on the political agenda and pressured policy-makers to adopt more risk averse or precautionary policies. 1986 witnessed both the nuclear accident at Although concern among the British public over health effects of eating meat of BSEdiagnosed cattle continued to grow throughout the 1990s, the British government denied the legitimacy of the public's concerns. Its position was accepted by the European Commission, which placed only limited restrictions on the sale of British beef. 21 The crisis over BSE broke in 1996 in the UK, when the British Government announced that ten cases of Creutzfeld-Jakob disease had been diagnosed in humans, and that these cases were likely related to exposure to the cattle disease BSE. The Commission responded by issuing a global ban on the export of British beef and widespread slaughter of cattle in Britain, and to a lesser extent, in other Member States. While both the Commission and its scientific advisory body subsequently certified British beef as safe for human consumption, the EU's belated failure to recognize its health hazards severely undermined public trust in EU food safety regulations and the scientific expertise on which they were based. It also led to the deaths of approximately 100 people, primarily in the UK.
The regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of the European public toward GM foods. 57 This was especially true in Britain, where unfavourable press coverage of agro biotechnology increased substantially following the eat was not a good enough approach. We had to look at the entire process by which food is produced." 60 As one British scholar put it, "the BSE scandal represents the biggest failure in UK public policy since the 1956 Suez Crisis." 61 It also emerged on the heels of a long line of food scares in the United Kingdom, including an outbreak of e-coli in Scotland, salmonella in eggs, and listeria. In 1999, a major public health scare emerged over dioxin contamination of food products produced in Belgium, leading to both the fall of the Belgium Government and the removal of all Belgium food products from stores throughout Europe, as well as a crisis involving the safety of Coca-Cola, though the later turned out to have no scientific basis. 62 As a senior European official noted in 2000, "the past years have seen a big dip in consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply and, as a consequence, in Member State authorities tasked with the job of overseeing the food industry. There seems to be an endless supply of (food scares.)" 63 The regulatory failure associated with mad-cow disease also had important political consequences in Europe. It dramatically exposed the gap between the single market -which exposes all European consumers to goods produced anywhere within the EU -and the inability of European institutions to assure the safety of the products sold within that market.
At the EU level it led to the decision in December 2000 to create a European food safety agency. It also called into question the functioning of the "comitology" system, the EU's term for the structure of advisory bodies that it relies on for expert advice. For the European Commission had relied on the advice of the Scientific Veterinary Committee which was chaired by a British scientist and which primarily reflected the thinking of the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food -advice which subsequently proved flawed. 64 
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Many of the changes in European regulatory administration reflect the effort to establish institutional arrangements that will reduce the future likelihood of "regulatory capture."
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The mad-cow crisis also affected regulatory institutions and policy making at the national level, leading for example, to the creation of a consumer protection "super ministry" in Germany and the establishment of national food safety agencies in both Great Britain and
France.
There have also been regulatory failures in Europe in other policy areas. During the early 1990s, the French Government was widely criticized for responding too slowly to the public health and workplace dangers associated with use of asbestos. 66 In spite of overwhelming evidence that asbestos constituted a serious health hazard, killing approximately 2,000 people a year according to a French government study, its manufacturing, importation and sale was not severely restricted until 1996, nearly two decades after the United States began to take regulatory action and after it had been banned in seven other European countries. Ano ther, far more consequential scandal was the apparent failure of French governmental officials and doctors to protect haemophiliacs from blood contaminated with the AIDS virus. 67 This issue, which became highly visible during the early 1990s, led to the resignation and criminal indictment of three senior government officials, including the Prime Minister. Three senior medical officials were convicted of criminal negligence and fraud and were sentenced to prison. Officials were accused of failing to adequately screen blood donors, delaying the approval of an American technology to test blood in order to benefit a French institute, and knowingly allowing contaminated blood to be given to patients. The deaths of more 300 haemophiliacs were linked to these decisions. While haemophiliacs were given contaminated blood in several countries, their 24 rate of HIV inflection was significantly higher in France. As in the case of asbestos, the French government's regulatory failure was widely attributed to its placing economic interests over public health.
"Le sang contaminé" (contaminated blood) scandal in France, like mad-cow disease in the UK, had significant domestic repercussions. It shocked French public opinion, calling into question the public's historic high rega rd for the competence of the public sector in a highly paternalistic state. It also continues to haunt French politicians, making them highly risk-averse, particularly with respect to potential threats to public health. Significantly,
ministers have accepted nearly every recommendation of L'Agence Francaise de Securité
Sanitaire des Aliments, France's recently established food safety agency, which has statutory responsibility for reviewing all government food safety policies -lest they be accused of where it has historically been strong, and France, Italy and Belgium, where it previously was not. Moreover the party had nearly 150 members in 11 of the 15 EU national legislatures. 76 In sum, while substantial national differences in regulatory priorities persist within the EU, political support for more stringent protective regulations has become more widespread in Europe.
The Europe an Union
In addition to a series of regulatory failures, and related broadening and deepening of public support for more stringent regulatory polices within Europe, the emergence of the EU as a more important source of regulatory policy-making has also affected the stringency and As Majone has noted, the EU is primarily a regulatory state: issuing rules is its most important vehicle for shaping public policy in Europe. 78 Notwithstanding frequent criticisms of the EU's "democratic deficit," its institutions have played an important role in strengthening the representation of civic or diffused interests. The influence of consumer and environmental pressure groups on the Commission remains limited and they typically enjoy less access than representatives of business. 79 There however are exceptions: the European Consumers Union did lead a successful campaign calling for the EU to ban beef hormone s, while Greenpeace worked with Green Parties to mobilize public and political opposition against the approval of GMOs in Europe. In addition, the "European Court of Justice has often played a crucial role in promoting civic interests" and has been repeatedly willing "to be influence by consumer and civic concerns in reaching its judgments." The EU's structure has also magnified the influence of the "greener" member states.
As Heritier argues, an important key to understanding the dynamics of EU policy-making lies in the logic of diversity, "which initiates a spontaneous acceleration of policy-making by regulatory competition and mutual learning. " 83 Formally, EU policy is highly centralized:
directives are approved in Brussels and then the Member States are obligated to transpose them into national law and then enforce them. But in fact EU policy-making is highly fragmented. If supporters of more stringent regulatory standards can persuade decisionmakers in one or more Member States that their ideas have merit, "these policy-makers will carry this point of view into the EU process." 84 Accordingly, "the significant participation of the member states means that the various ideas that circulate at the national level may in turn diffuse into the EU level." 85 This is also the case when Member States unilaterally enact more stringent regulatory standards -a dynamic that has often contributed to a "trend toward higher and tougher standards by Brussels."
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The EU's federal structure, along with its separation of powers among the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the ECJ has provided representatives 31 of civic interests with multiple points of access. An entrepreneurial coalition favouring more stringent regulatory standards "needs ready access to only one part of the EU system (as long as that structural position provides a visible and vocal platform for the coalition's cause.)
Because EU institutions encompass such a wide array of interests, finding one sympathetic access point is relatively easy." 87 A fragmented political system also provides opponents of policy change with multiple veto points. The EU's constitutional structure does not automatically privilege civic interests any more than does the fragmented American system.
But, as the American experience of the 1970s illustrates, the multiple points of access offered by a fragmented political system, when combined with a highly mobilized and risk averse public, can lead to a significantly strengthening and broadening of regulatory standards. that, when they move from one country to another, they will benefit from the same high level of health and environmental protection.
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THE EUROPEAN PRESENT AND THE AMERICAN PAST
There are a number of similarities between regulatory policies and politics in Europe since the mid 1980s and those in the US from the early 1960s through around 1990. During these three decades, an influential segment of American elite and public opinion became more risk-averse, often focusing on the dangers of new technologies rather than their potential benefits. One British journalist wrote in 1971: "We saw the Americans thrashing around from one pollution scare to the next, and we were mildly amused. One moment it was cyclamates, mercury the next, then ozone, lead, cadmium -over there they seemed set on working their way in a random manner through the whole periodic Try to read a newspaper or news magazine . . . ; on any day some alarm bells will be ringing. What are Americans afraid of? Nothing much, really except the food they eat, the water they drink, the air they breathe . . . . In the amazingly short space of fifteen to twenty years, confidence about the physical world has turned into doubt. Once the source of safety, science and technology has become the source of risk. 91 The argument in the US against public funding of a supersonic passenger airplane is similar to that made by many Europeans against regulatory approval for ge netically modified agricultural products a nearly quarter-century later: in both cases, a significant segment of the During the US in the 1970s and in the EU in the 1990s, consumer and environmental protection became defined as "rights," though the role of the courts in defining and asserting these "rights" has remained much more important in the US. 92 Thus in both America in the 1970s and 1980s and Europe since the mid 1980s, public preferences and concerns have played an important role in shaping both the regulatory agenda and specific regulatory policies. Significantly, a number of American regulatory policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s and European policies since the mid 1980s have been similarly criticized for being too risk averse and rooted more in public fears than scientific evidence. 93 In 1997, responding to the European demands for the separation of genetically-modified and non-GM foods, US Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman declared that "test after rigorous scientific test has proven these products to be safe. Sound science must trump passion." 94 But during the 1970s and 80s, many Americans were as sceptical as contemporary Europeans of relying on "sound science" to guide regulatory policy-making. 95 The United States, like Europe, also experienced a series of widely publicized regulatory failures whose cumulative effect was to increase public support for more effective regulatory policy-making more exposed to public scrutiny and pressure, which in turn strengthened the influence of pro-regulation constituencies and reduced the ability of business to dictate regulatory outcomes. 96 Significantly, the fragmented constitutional structure of the EU, with its separation of powers and federal division of responsibilities more closely resembles the US than it does it does any Member State.
What Happened in America?
This It is primarily with respect to the environmental agenda that has emerged since 1990
that America has become a regulatory laggard. 103 This generalization must now be re-examined, a process which Jasanoff herself begins at the end of her essay where she notes that "U.S. exceptionalism . . . is beginning to show signs of impermanence." 104 Over a decade later, it is now much clearer that the "American approach"
to health, safety and environmental regulation is no longer as distinctive as it appeared to students of comparative politics during the 1970s and 80s. 105 However some contemporary depictions of trans-Atlantic regulatory differences also need to be examined critically. For example, it is not the case that "deep-rooted cultural" differences" drive European and American policies on global climate change due to
Americans being "more individualistic, more concerned about their lifestyles than about the environment, and more ideologically averse to regulation." 106 The issue of global climate change has been more politically salient in Europe than in the US for more than a decade, 40 and, unlike in the US, European policy-makers have supported policies to reduce carbon emissions. But this hardly can reflect "deep-rooted cultural" differences between Europe and the US, since only thirty years ago, America enacted a more risk averse, innovative and comprehensive range of environmental and consumer regulations did any European country or the EU.
We are now in a better position to generalize about the dynamics of regulatory policymaking on both sides of the Atlantic. Consumer and environmental regulations are likely to become more innovative, comprehensive and risk averse as a response to a widespread public perception of regulatory failures. These regulatory failures have a spill-over effect: they both make public opinion more sensitive to the risks associated with new technologies and undermine public confidence in existing regulatory institutions. They also increase the political influence of political constituencies who favour more stringent regulatory policies and reduce the influence of business. Two policy consequences flow from this dynamic.
First, policy-makers become more likely to adopt more comprehensive and risk averse policies, even when these policies adversely affect the financial interests of important industries. Secondly, regulatory policy-making itself changes: it becomes more open, more transparent and more accessible to non-industry influences.
The American experience suggests that this policy dynamic can persist for an extended period of time. It persisted for nearly three decades in the US and the momentum for increased regulatory stringency in Europe has now lasted more than fifteen years. It however, does not last indefinably. As new procedures for making regulatory policies are established, and appear to be functioning reasonably effectively, the political salience of consumer and environmental regulation declines and public pressures for more stringent 41 standards diminishes. At the same time, the influence of industry on regulatory policymaking again increases as policy-makers become more responsive to arguments about the burdens rather than the benefits of regulation. The result is not a rolling back of existing standards, but rather policy gridlock. Thus even though the institutional changes that made policy-making more open and publicly accessible remain, there is a slow-down in the rate of ne w regulatory initiatives. This took place in the US after 1990 and will at some point occur in Europe.
1 Mikael Skou Andersen and Duncan Liefferink, eds, European Environmental Policy; The Pioneers
